

Theosophical Society's Publication.

THE

SĀṆKHYA KĀRIKA,

BY

ISWARA KRISHNA,

TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT

BY

HENRY THOMAS COLERBROOKE, ESQ.

ALSO

THE BHĀṢYA, OR, COMMENTARY OF

GAUDAPADA;

TRANSLATED AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT.

BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A., F.R.S.

PUBLISHED

BY

MR. TOOKARAM TATYA,

BOMBAY.

1887.





315
Theosophical Society's Publication.
8-3-53

THE

SĀṆKHYA KĀRIKĀ,

BY

ÍSWARA KRISHNA;

TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT

BY

HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE ESQ.

ALSO

THE BHĀSHYA, OR COMMENTARY OF

GAUDAPĀDA;

TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,

BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A.F.R.S.

PUBLISHED

BY

MR. TOOKARAM TATYA,

BOMBAY.

210
62-8-8

BOMBAY:--PRINTED AT THE SUB

PRESS.

सांख्यकारिका अथवा सांख्ययोग.

SĀNKHYA KĀRIKĀ

OR

SĀNKHYA YOGA.

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥

THE inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

सांख्यकारिकाभाष्यम्.

कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै येनाविद्योदधौ जगति मग्ने ।

कारुण्यात्सांख्यमयी नौरिव विहिता प्रतरणाय ॥

अल्पग्रन्थं स्पष्टं प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तम् ।

शास्त्रं शिष्यहिताय समासतोऽहं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥

दुःखत्रयेति । अस्या आचार्या उपोद्धातः क्रियते ॥ इह भगवा-

न्ब्रह्मसुतः कपिलो नाम । तद्यथा—

सनकश्चसनन्दनश्च तृतीयश्च सनातनः ।

आसुरिः कपिलश्चैव वोढुः पञ्चशिखस्तथा ।

इत्येते ब्रह्मणः पुत्राः सप्त प्रोक्ता महर्षयः ॥

कपिलस्य सहोत्पन्ना धर्मो ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्यञ्चेति । एवं स
उत्पन्नः सन्नन्धतमसि मज्जज्जगदालोक्य संसारपारम्पर्येण
सत्कारुण्यो जिज्ञासमानाय आसुरिसगोत्राय ब्रह्मणायेदं पञ्च-
विंशतितत्त्वानां ज्ञानमुक्तवान् । यस्य ज्ञानाद्दुःखक्षयो भवति ।

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र तत्राश्रमे वसेत् ।

जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥

तदिदमाहुः । दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासेति । तत्र दुःखत्रयं—आ-
ध्यात्मिकं । आधिभौतिकं आधिदैविकं चेति ॥ तत्राध्यात्मिकं
द्विविधं—शारीरं मानसं चेति । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्माविपर्यय-
कृतं ज्वरातीसारादि । मानसं प्रियवियोगाप्रियसंयोगादि ॥ आ-
धिभौतिकं चतुर्विधं—भूतग्रामनिमित्तं मनुष्यपशुमृगपाक्षिसरीसृप-
दंशमशकयूकामत्कुणमत्स्यमकरग्राहस्थावरेभ्यो जरायुजाण्डजस्वे-
दजोद्भिज्जेभ्यः सकाशादुपजायते ॥ आधिदैविकं—देवानामिदं
दैविकं । दिवः प्रभवतीति वा दैवं तदधिकृत्य यदुपजायते शीतो-
ष्णवातवर्षाशनिपातादिकं ॥ एवं यथा दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञा-
सा कार्या क । तदभिघातके हेतौ । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अभिघा-
तको योऽसौ हेतुस्तत्रेति ॥ दृष्टे सापार्था चेत् । दृष्टे हेतौ दुःखत्र-
याभिघातके सा जिज्ञासाऽपार्था चेद्यादि । तत्राध्यात्मिकस्य द्वि-
विधस्यापि आयुर्वेदशास्त्रक्रियया प्रियसमागमाप्रियपरिहारक-
दुत्तक्तकषायादिकाथादिभिर्दृष्ट एव आध्यात्मिकोपायः । आधि-
भौतिकस्य रक्षादिनाऽभिघातो दृष्टः । दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेदेवं म-

न्यसे । न । एकान्तासन्ततोऽभावात् । यत एकान्ततोऽवश्यं
असन्ततो निसं दृष्टेन हेतुनाऽभिघातो न भवति तस्मादन्यत्र
एकान्तासन्तभिघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा विविदिषा कार्येति ।

BHĀSHYA.

Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sāṅkhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.

I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students ; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establishing certain results.

Three sorts of pain.—The explanation of this Ārya stanza is as follows :

The divine KAPILA, the son of BRAHMA indeed : as it is said, "SANAKA, SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third ; ĀSURI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PANCHASIKA : these seven sons of Brahmā were termed great sages." Together with KAPILA were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power : for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound darkness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with compassion ; and to his kinsman, the Brāhman ĀSURI, he communicated a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES ; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said ; "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever "order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear "braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated "(from existence) : of this there is no doubt."

The inquiry is in consequence of the *embarrassment* of the three sorts of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (*ādhyātmika*) natural and inseparable ; 2. (*ādhibhāutika*) natural and extrinsic ; and 3. (*ādhidaivika*) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental

corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm : mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation or elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings; whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, mosquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, *daivika* meaning either divine or atmospheric : in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of three kinds of pain, to be made? *Into the means of precluding them.* This is the inquiry. *Nor is the inquiry superfluous.* That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you think in this manner, it is not so; for *absolute, certain, final, permanent*, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final.

COMMENT.

The first verse of the *Kārikā* proposes the subject of the work, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the

Hindus; the common end of which is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his *Gymnosophista*, containing the translation of the *Káriká*, has given a version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke's. He thus renders it: "E tergeminorum colorum impetu oritur desiderium cognoscendæ rationis, qua ii depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni ævo superstitis remedii."

In the first member of this sentence, the translation of *abhigáta* by 'impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is 'impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.' So the same word *abhigátaka* is immediately used to mean 'preventing, removing,' 'depellens.' Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads *apaghátaka*, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the *Sánkhya Bhâshya* or *Sánkhya Kaumudî*; it is that of the *S. Tatva Kaumudî* and *S. Chandriká*, and although itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable

variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word *abhigāta* may be used in the sense of 'depellere,' and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior, member of the hemistich. So in the *Bhāshya* of GAURAPADA we have *ādhibhautikasya rakshādina abhigātaḥ*; 'The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection and the like.' It would not be possible here to render *abhigāta* by 'impetus.' By VACHASPATI the term *abhigāta* is defined 'the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here 'life'), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.'* NARAYANA interprets it more concisely *asakya sambandhaḥ*,† 'intolerable restraint.' 'Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.

This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made:

"Hæc posterioris versus (*drishtë* etc.) interpretatio, sicut scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam deseruisse censear. enim: 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.' Sed vereover, ne vir summus constructione particulæ *chêt* sententiam claudentis et a negatione exceptæ male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. procem. d. 2. Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset: *drishtë sati* (i. e. *yadyapi drishtam vidyatē*) *sā* (*jijnā*

* दुःखत्रयेणांतःकरणवर्तिना प्रतिकूलतया चेतनाशक्तेरभिसंबन्धोऽभिघातः ।

† असह्यसंबन्धः ।

*apàrthá na èkànt—abhávát.** Sed ut omittam, particulæ *chèt* nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, *na* inopportuno versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et claudicat. Equidem construo: *drishté sá (jijnásá) apàrthá (bhavati) chèt (tathàpi) na (apàrthá bhavati) èkàntà—abhávát.†* Prorsus similiter dicitur *nābhávát* infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur *ekāntyatyantoh abhávát*, non ad *drishté* refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem quæ cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam quæ post *chennā* sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur præterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad *drishté* enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilibus cognitione non attingi posse philosophiæ finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu continentur: philosophiæ (id enim valet *jijnásá*, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quæ primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ille per negationem enuntiat."

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian: arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for given Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced

* दृष्टे सति (यद्यपि दृष्टं विद्यते) सा (जिज्ञासा) अपार्था न एका-भावात् ।

† दृष्टे सा (जिज्ञासा) अपार्था (भवति) चेत् (तथाऽपि) न (अपार्था भव-) एकान्त-भावात् ।

is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again.

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression *chenna* or *chēna* 'if,' *na*, 'not:' the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expression. But this division of the compound is not that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, *chēt* referring to what has been said, implying, 'if you assert or believe this;' and meeting it with a *negatur*, 'it is not so:' then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the *Muktāra* 'But why should not Darkness be called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception? If this be said, it is not so (*chēn-na*); for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things.* So in the *Nyāya Sūtra Vritti*: 'If by the disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech and through the want of a reply there be defeat; if this be urged, it is not so (*iti chēn-na*), because there has been opportunity for an answer.† Again in the *Sankhya Pravachana Bhāṣya*. Sūtra:—'If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent state.‡ Comment:—'But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will

* ननु दशमं द्रव्यं तमः कुतो नोक्तं? तद्धि प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति चेन्न
आवश्यकतेजोऽभावेनोपपत्तौ द्रव्यान्तरकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् ।

† सभाक्षोभादिना चेदननुभाषणमेव उत्तराप्रतिपत्त्या चेदप्रतिभैति चेन्न-उर-
वसराभावात् ।

‡ प्रकृतिनिबन्धाच्चेन्न? तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ।

plained in the following precept.* Also in the *Vedānta*
śāstra Vivṛiti: 'If in consequence of such texts of the Védas
 "let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures" their
 performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites
 must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of
 true knowledge; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of
 true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies;
 then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew
 the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (*iti chēn-nā*), from
 the compatibility of severalty with union, as in the case of
 articles of khayra or other wood:† that is, where there are
 several obligations, that which is most essential may be select-
 ed from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous
 term used affirmatively; as, 'But how by the efficacy of
 knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the
 object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially
 happy (being) be attained? for as he is eternally existent,
 knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this
 be asserted, it is true (*iti chēt; satyam*). Brahme, one
 essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a
 state of ignorance he is not obtained; like a piece of gold
 which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round
 the neck.‡ Here it would be impossible to refer *satyam* to
 the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being
 separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle
iti. Passages of this description might be indefinitely

* न न प्रकृतिनिमित्ताद्वन्धो भवत्विति चेन्न ? यस्तस्तस्या अपि बन्धकत्वे संयोग-
 तत्त्वमुत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणमस्ति ।

† ननु यज्ञादीनां यावज्जीवं वाक्येनावश्यकर्तव्यतया प्राप्तानां विविदिषार्थत्वे-
 त्यानित्यसंयोगः प्रसज्येत । यदि च विविदिषार्थं यज्ञानुष्ठानमपरिमितं ततः सं-
 रक्ष्यावृत्तूनां द्विरनुष्ठानं स्यादिति चेन्न ? स्वादिगादिवत् । संयोगपृथक्त्वोपपत्तेः ।

‡ नन्वविद्यानिवृत्तेविद्यासाध्यत्वेन प्रयोजनत्वेऽपि कथं स्वरूपानन्दस्य । त-
 त्वं तस्य नित्यप्राप्तत्वेन विद्यासाध्यत्वाभावादिति चेत् सत्यं नित्यं प्राप्तमप्यानन्दा-
 न्नस्वरूपमविद्यावस्थायां विस्मृतकण्ठगतवामीकरवदनवाप्तं भवति ।

multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the construction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.

Accordingly his version is uniformly supported *scholiastarum suffragiis*. Thus in the *Sankya Bhāṣya*, as we have seen, the passage is explained, *drishṭe sā apārtha chēt evam manyasē ekānta*, &c.; 'If by reason of there being obvious remedies, *y* think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.' So in the *Sankya Tatva Kaumudī*, after stating the objection at length, the commentator adds, *nirākaroti, na iti*; '(the author) refutes it (saying), no, not so.' *kutah*, 'why?' *ekāntatyantatah abhāvāt*. The *Sankhya Chandrikā* is to the same effect, or still more explicit: 'There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained: if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it; no, it is not so.† This commentator giving the very reading, *drishṭi sati*, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's version would erroneously require. The remaining scholiast, RĀMA KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the *Chanubrikā* word for word and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.

With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connection of the negative with the latter member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is grounded. Thus in the *Hilopadesa*: 'What will not be, will

* निगकरोति नेति । कुतः एकान्त-अभावात् ।

† दृष्टे सति सा जिज्ञासा अपार्था अन्यथासिद्धास्तीति चोदित्यर्थः । निषेधयामेति ।

not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.* So in v. 8. of the *Kārikā*: 'The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity†.' In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text.

These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr Colebrooke's accuracy; and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation.

‡ But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to

* यदभावि न तद्भावि भाविचेन्नतदन्यथा ।

† सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्न तदभावात् ।

‡ एवं हि न शास्त्रविषयो तिज्ञास्येत यदि दुःखं नाम जगति न स्यात् । सद्वा न जिहासितं । जिहासितं स्याद्वाशक्यं समुच्छेदं । अशक्यं समुच्छेदता च द्वेधा । दुःखस्य नित्यत्वाद्वा तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा । शक्यं समुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपायत्वाद्वा । सुकरोपायान्तरस्य सद्वावाद्वा । तत्र न तावद्दुःखं नास्ति ताप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तं । दुःखत्रयाभेदात्तादिति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयं । तत्त्वत्वाध्यात्मिकमाधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं चेति । तत्राध्यात्मिकं द्विविधं शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तं । मानसं कामक्रोधलोभमोभयेष्वविपादविशेषदर्शननिवन्धनं । सर्वं चैतदन्तरोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखं । आध्यात्मसाध्यं च दुःखं द्वेधा । आधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं च । तत्राधिभौतिकं अनुपशुभ्रगपक्षि सरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तं । आधिदैविकं यक्षराक्षसविनायकप्रद-

avoid it; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The impossibility of extirpating it is twofold; either from the eternality of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation: or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its removal; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. *From the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain.*—A triad of pain, three kinds: they are the *ādhyātmika*, 'Natural;' *ādhibhautika*, 'extrinsic;' and *ādhidaivika*, 'superhuman.' The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental; bodily is caused by disorder of the humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (*Yakshas, Rākshasas, Vināyakas* &c.). These kinds of pain depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment,

दुःखविशनिवन्धनं । तदेतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यं
त्याख्यातुं । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना प्रतिकूलतयाचेतनाशक्तेरभिसं-
न्धोऽभिघातः । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः । यद्यपि न सा-
रुध्यते दुःखं तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्ठात्रिवेदयिष्यते । तथा च
पपन्नं तदपघातके हेताविति । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्यापघातकस्तदपघातकः । उप-
जर्जेनस्यापि बुध्यानिःकृष्य तदापरमशोः ॥ तदपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रव्युत्पत्ति-
नान्य इत्याशयः ॥ तत्र शङ्कते । दृष्टे सापार्था चेत् । अयमर्थः । अस्तु दुःखं
जिहासतु तच्चेतनः भवतु च तच्छक्यहानं सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायास्तदु-
क्तं तथाप्यत्र जिहासा प्रेक्षवता मयुक्ता । दृष्टस्यैवोपायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुक-

confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of knowing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subsequently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. *Tad apaghātuké: tad* refers here to the three kinds of pain, *tad* having the relation dependent upon its being used as subordinate (relative) term. *The means (hetu) of removing*—These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source; this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected; *As there are obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous; if so*—The sense is this: Be it admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them; that escape is practicable; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, and traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore, according to the popular saying, "Why should a man who may find honey in the *arkku* flower, go for it to the mountain?" so what wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has obtained the object of his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for

यमानत्वत् । तत्त्वज्ञानस्य त्वनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायाससाध्यतया प्रतिदुष्कर-
त् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाषकः ॥ अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं
येत् । इष्टस्यार्थस्य सम्प्राप्तौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेदिति ॥ सान्ति चोपायाः शतशः
रौरदुःखप्रतीकारायेतत्करा भिषजां वरैरुपादिष्टाः । मनसस्यापि तापस्य प्रती-
काराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनीवलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपाय ईषत्कारः
माधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्यानाध्या-
यादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः । तथाधिदैविकस्य दुःखस्यमणिमन्त्राशुपयोगः
रः प्रतीकारोपाय इति । निराकरोति । नोते । कुतः । एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽ
यात् । एकान्तो दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यं भावः । अत्यन्तो दुःखस्यानिवृत्तस्य पुनर-

bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and political science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes it; *it is not so*. Why? From these means *not being absolute or final*. *Ekanta* means the certainty of the cessation of pain; *atyanta*, the non-recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is) the non-existence of both these properties; the *atitanti*, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual;—as it is said; “From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in consequence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain operation (is predicated); so is their temporary influence, from observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other means) is not superfluous.” This is the purport (of the text).’

The *Sāṅkhya Chandrika* and *S. Kaumudi* are both to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original *Sūtra* of KAPILA, as collected in the *S. Pravarāṇa*, and comment on by VIJṆĀNA BHĪKṢHU, confirm the view taken by scholiasts.

नुत्पादः । तयोरेकान्तात्यन्तयोरभावात् । एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभाव इति द्विवचनस्थाने सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसि । एतदुक्तं भवति । यथा विधिरसायनकान्तीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपयोगेऽपि तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तौ नानादेर्कान्तकत्वं । निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनादनात्यन्तिकत्वमिति । रोऽप्येकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति नापार्था जिज्ञासेति ॥

Utra:—‘The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is final object of soul.’

Comment:—‘The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul †’

Utra:—‘The accomplishment of that cessation is not from worldly means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression.‡’

Comment:—‘The accomplishment of the final cessation of pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the like. Whence is this? Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted.’§

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सत्यविशद्विषयातिशययुक्तः।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥२॥

II.

THE revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

अत्र त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ।

एषां त्रिविधदुःखानां यात्यन्तनिवृत्तिः स्थूलसूक्ष्मसाधारण्येन निःशेषतो नः सोऽत्यन्तः परमः पुरुषार्थः ।

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिनिवृत्तेरवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।

लौकिकादुपायाद्वनादेरत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्तिसिद्धिर्नास्ति । कुतः । धनादिना निवृत्तः पश्चाद्वनक्षये पुनरपि दुःखानुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।

यदि दृष्टान्यत्रजिज्ञासा कार्य्या ततोऽपि नैव यत आनुश्रविकं
हेतुर्दुःखत्रयाभिघातकः । अनुश्रवतीत्यनुश्रवस्तत्रभवः आनुश्र-
विकः स च आगमात्सिद्धः । यथा

अपाम सोमममृता अभूमागन्मज्योतिरविदाम देवान्
किन्नूनमस्मान् कृणवदरातिः किमु धूर्त्तिरमृतमर्त्यस्य ॥

कदाचिदिन्द्रादीनां देवानां कल्प आसीत् । कथं वयममृता अ-
भूमेति विचार्यामुंचस्मादयमपाम सोमं पीतवन्तः सोमं तस्माद-
मृता अभूम अमरा भूतवन्त इत्यर्थः किंच अगन्म ज्योतिः गत-
वतो लब्धवतो ज्योतिः स्वर्गमिति । अविदाम देवान् दिव्यान्
विदितवन्तः । एवं च किन्नूनमस्मान् कृणवदरातिः नूनं निश्चि-
तं किं अरातिः शत्रुरस्मान् कृणवत् कर्त्तेति किमु धूर्त्तिरमृत-
मर्त्यस्य धूर्त्तिर्जरा हिंसा वा किं करिष्यति अमृतमर्त्यस्य ॥
अन्यच्चवेदे श्रूयते आसन्नितकं फलं पशुवधेन । सर्वाल्लोका ऊज-
याति मृत्युं तरति पाप्मानं तरति ब्रह्महत्यां तरति यो योऽश्वमे-
धेन यजत इति । एकान्तासन्नितके एव वेदोक्ते अपार्यैवजिज्ञा-
सा इति न । उच्यते । दृष्टवदानुश्रविक इति दृष्टेन तुल्यो दृष्टव-
त् । कोऽसौ आनुश्रविकः कस्मात्स यस्मादविशुद्धिक्षयातिशय-
युक्तः । अविशुद्धियुक्तः पशुघातात् तथाचोक्तं ।

पट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।

अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥

यद्यपि श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो धर्मस्तथापि मिश्रीभावादविशुद्धियु-
क्तइति । यथा

बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि देवानां च युगे युगे ।

कालेन समतितानि कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः ॥

एवमिन्द्रादिनाशात्क्षययुक्तः । तथा ऽतिशयो विशेषस्तेन युक्तः । विशेषगुणादर्शनादितरस्य दुःखं स्यादिति । एवमानुश्रविकोऽपि हेतुर्दृष्टवत् ॥ कस्तर्हि श्रेयानिति चेत् । उच्यते । तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् ताभ्यां दृष्टानुश्रविकाभ्यां विपरीतः श्रेयान् प्रशस्यतर इति । अविशुद्धिर्क्षयातिशयायुक्तत्वात् । स कथमित्याह । व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् तत्र व्यक्तं महदादिबुद्धिरहंकारः पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चमहाभूतानि । अव्यक्तं प्रधानं । ज्ञःपुरुषः । एवमेतानि पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वानि व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाने कथ्यन्ते एताद्विज्ञानाच्छ्रेय इत्युक्तं च पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वज्ञ इति ॥ अथ व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां को विशेष इत्युच्यते ।

BHASHYA.

Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvious remedies, yet it is not to be directed to such as are derivable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. *Anusravati*, 'what man successively hears;' *anusravika*, 'that which is thence produced, revealed mode;' that is, established by the Védas : as it is said ; " We drank the juice of the acid asclepias ; we became immortal ; we attained effulgence ; we know divine things. What harm can a foe inflict on us ? How can decay affect an immortal ? " (This text of the Vêda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, " we were drinkers of *soma* juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods : further, " We ascended to, or attained effulgence, or heaven ; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us ? What decay can affect an immortal ? " *dhurtti* meaning 'decay' or 'injury : ' 'What can it do to an immortal being ?'

It is also said in the Vêdas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice : " He who offers the *ashvamedha* conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the

murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute consequence is prescribed in the Védas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; but this is not the case. The text says, *the revealed mode is like the temporal one—drishtavat*; 'like, same as the temporal,' *drishtena tulyā*. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual)? *It is impure, defective in some respects, and excessive in others*. It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices; as, "according to the ritual of the *ashvamedha*, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday." For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Vedas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said; "Many thousands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome." Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior advantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, *atīśaya* is understood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice; the object of the ritual of the Védas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the revealed mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode? If this be asked, it is replied, *One different from both*. A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this? It is explained (in the text: *It consists in a discriminative knowledge* &c. Here, by *perceptible principles*, are intended *Mahat* and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtle rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The *imperceptible one* is *Pradhana* (the chief or great one). The *thinking soul*, *Purusha* (the incorporeal). These twenty-five principles are intended by the (three) terms *vyakta*, *avyakta*, and *jna*. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge).

The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and thinking principles, is next explained.

COMMENT.

Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the Védas, are equally unavailing; and knowledge of the three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.

The Védas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in prescribing the shedding of blood: the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas is merely a long duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Védas also cause, instead of curing pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by GAURAPADA to *ātisaya*, and the *Sankhya Tatva Kaumudi* understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Védas themselves: 'The *gyotishtoma* and other rites secure simply heaven; the *vajapeya* and others confer the sovereignty of heaven: this is being possessed of the property of excess (inequality)†.'

In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPILA affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there 'is no difference between them,‡ and that 'escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter,|| because 'recurrence is neverthe-

* अमृतत्वाभिधानं चिरस्ये मानमुपलक्षयति यदाह आभूतसम्प्लवं स्वान-
ममृतत्वं भाष्यते ॥ विष्णु पुराणं ॥

† ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रसाधनं वाजपेयादयः स्वराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्तं ।

‡ अविशेषश्चोभयोः ।

|| नानुश्रविकादपि तत् सिद्धिः ।

less the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion),* as 'the consequences of acts are not eternal.'† Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Vēda also says, 'There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion).‡ This is explained away by a Sūtra of Kapila, which declares that the Vēda limits the non-regeneration of one who has attained the region of Brahmā to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom.§

This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. *Vyakta*, 'that which is perceived, sensible, discrete;' *Avyakta*, 'that which is unperceived, indiscrete;' and *Jna*, 'that which knows, or discriminates:' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications; the second is crude, unmodified matter; and the third is soul. The object of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of soul from body.

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तुविकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥

III.

NATURE, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the *Great* or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

* कर्मसाध्यत्वेन पुनरावृत्तिः ।

† कर्मणा ब्रह्मलोकगतस्यानावृत्तिः ।

‡ कर्मसाध्यस्य चानित्यत्वे ।

§ तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्चातिः ।

मूलप्रकृतिः प्रधानं । प्रकृतिविकृतिसप्तकस्य मूलभूतत्वात् ।
मूलं च साप्रकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः । अन्यस्मान्नोत्पद्यते
तेन प्रकृतिः कस्याचिद्विकारो न भवति । महदाद्याः प्रकृति-
विकृतयः सप्त । महाभूतादिति बुद्धिः बुद्ध्याद्याः सप्त बुद्धि
१ अहंकारः २ पञ्चतन्मात्राणि ५ एतानि सप्तप्रकृतिविकृ-
तयः । तद्यथा । प्रधानाद्बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेनाविकृतिः प्रधानस्य
विकार इति सैवाहंकारमुत्पादयति अतः प्रकृतिः । अहंकारो-
ऽपि बुद्धेरुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः स च पञ्चतन्मात्राण्युत्पादय-
तीति प्रकृतिः । तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृति-
स्तस्मादाकाशमुत्पद्यत इति प्रकृतिः । तथा स्पर्शतन्मात्रमहंका-
रादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं वायुमुत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः ।
गन्धतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं पृथिवीमुत्पाद-
यतीति प्रकृतिः । रूपतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं
तेज उत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । रसतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति
विकृतिस्तदेवं आप उत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । एवं महदाद्याः
सप्त प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्च ॥ षोडशकश्च विकारः पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रि-
याणि पञ्चकर्मेन्द्रियाणि एकादशं मनः पञ्चमहाभूतानि एष
षोडशको गणो विकृतिरेव । विकारो विकृतिः ॥ न प्रकृतिर्न
विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ एवमेषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां
कैः क्रियद्भिः प्रमाणैः केन कस्य वा प्रमाणेन सिद्धिर्भवति ।
इह लोके प्रमेयवस्तु प्रमाणेन साध्यते यथा प्रस्थादिभिर्ग्री-
ह्यस्तुलया चन्दनादि । तस्मात् प्रमाणमभिधेयम् ।

BHÁSHYA.

Mūla (the root) *prakṛiti* (nature) is *pradhāna* (chief), from
its being the root of the seven principles which are productions

and productive ; such nature is the root. *No production.*—It is not produced from another : on that account nature (*prakriti*) is no product of any other thing. *Seven principles.*—*Mahat* and the rest ; from its being the great (*mahat*) element ; this is Intellect (*Buddhi*). *Intellect and the rest.*—The seven principles are, 1. Intellect ; 2. Egotism ; 3—7. The five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and productive : in this manner ; Intellect is produced from the *chief* one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive (*prakriti*). Egotism, as derived from intellect, is a production ; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production ; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a production from Egotism ; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production ; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the *Great* principle and the rest are productions and productive. *Sixteen are productions* ; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements : these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term *vikāra* being the same as *vikriti*. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principles) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a *prastha* (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.